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ABSTRACT China’s President Xi Jinping’s Central Asian tour in fall 2013 marked Beijing’s
unprecedented (re)turn to Central Asia as a lynchpin of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” of the
globally ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s BRI positions Central Asia as the
crucial nexus for the cross-regional long-distance loops of trade, investment, and infrastructure development. By revisiting the classical geopolitical theory about the original Eurasian Heartland and its contemporary offshoots, we extract some insights for understanding
the new China-Central Asia transboundary regional nexus. In a double-pronged empirical
analysis of China’s development strategies regarding Central Asia, we examine: (1) the
construction of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to transmit energy all the way to
China’s east coast, and (2) the launch and expansion of the Eurasian Railroad to transport
goods from China’s manufacturing bases in both coastal and inland regions to Europe and
Central Asia. In synthesizing the ﬁndings from this coupled analysis through classical and
contemporary theoretical lenses, we discuss how China’s growing inﬂuence in Central Asia
via the BRI can reshape the region’s diverse national interests, development opportunities and
constraints while fostering closer China-Central Asia bilateral cooperation across multiple
national boundaries. In light of the analysis, we also offer an updated view and critique of the
classical Heartland/Rimland theories and discuss how a China-centric “New Great Game”
differs from its original nineteenth century antecedent while pointing to similar
underpinnings.
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Introduction
entral Asia has always been important to China’s imagination of and action toward its neighbors and the larger
world beyond. As the vast middle section of the ancient
Silk Road dating back to the Han Dynasty (207 BCE–220 CE),
Central Asia connected and bridged China’s long-distance
overland trade with Europe and the Middle East for many centuries. Central Asia formed the inevitable path for Genghis Khan
and his descendants in their advancement to and conquering of
such far-ﬂung places as Poland and Syria. Neighboring China
from the west, Central Asia has been the source of periodic
Turkic and Islamic inﬂuence and connections to Xinjiang, which
China, regardless of its regimes, has always seen as crucial to the
stability of its vast western border territory over the most recent
centuries. Fast forward to the twenty-ﬁrst century, Central Asia
emerged as the region of new opportunities for China’s ambitious “Go West” initiative to stimulate catch-up development in
its lagging interior and border regions by redirecting surplus
capital from the its largely saturated coastal region. More
importantly and recently, Central Asia has become integral to
China’s “One Belt, One Road” or “Belt and Road initiative
(hereafter BRI), unveiled ﬁrst by President Xi Jinping in
Kazakhstan in 2013, for reviving and expanding the old Silk
Road through the new Silk Road Economic Belt and the twentyﬁrst-century Maritime Silk Road.
With and via the BRI, China is potentially capable of reshaping
Central Asia’s economic potential through reorganizing and
expanding ties with the latter. While China and Central Asia were
linked through peace, war, trade, and intermarriage for centuries,
these links are beginning to undergo a wide and deep metamorphosis as China has undergone a fundamental domestic
economic transformation and risen powerfully on the global
stage. To fully understand this combination of China’s inside-out
inﬂuence in Central Asia, we need to: (1) locate the sources and
mechanisms that animate and transmit that inﬂuence from inside
and outside of China; (2) assess the regional and local consequences of China’s presence in Central Asia; and (3) identify
the existing and future opportunities and barriers for developing
close and equitable China-Central Asia relations. This integrated
analysis not only draws from classical theories bearing on Central
Asia and China but also can advance the theorizing of globalization, regional cooperation and local development, as well as
their interconnections beyond the new China-Central Asia nexus.
In the next section, we review and critique the classical geopolitical theories for understanding China’s current engagement
with Central Asia and how its geoeconomic dynamism invites us
to develop new theorization about the impact and implications of
China’s BRI for Central Asia. This leads to on a short section how
China-led on “New Great Game” differs from the original “Great
Game” between Victoria Britain and Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century. In the next three sections, we examine how two
China-driven strategies, emanating from inside and outside
China, have begun to exert multiple and mutually reinforcing
long-distance effects on key entry points and parts of Central
Asia. They are: (1) the construction of oil and gas pipelines from
Central Asia to transmit energy all the way to China’s east coast;
and (2) the launch and expansion of the Eurasian Railroad to
transport goods from China’s manufacturing bases in its coastal,
inland, and border regions. The ﬁnal section returns to an integrated theory-policy discussion based on the preceding analysis,
advancing the argument that as China widens and deepens its
inﬂuence within and through Central Asia, it is effectively recentering the latter as a new transnational regional space whose
future importance is likely to exceed its long historical status and
role. In other words, China’s “New Great Game” via the BRI is
likely to outdo the original “Great Game” in rendering Central
2

Asia the renewed center of the broader Eurasia region that bears
stronger and more strategic global signiﬁcance.
Back to the future: revisiting the Heartland theory and more
It is a somewhat ironic that while the history of Central Asia over
the last century has been eventful and volatile, there is a certain
consistent and enduring theoretical thread running from the turn
of the twentieth century through the present, shedding some light
from the long past on recent dynamics. That theoretical source
originated in 1904 when British geographer Halford John
Mackinder introduced a theory of the Heartland that has since
shaped our subsequent understanding of Central Asia through
the past century. Although Mackinder’s theory helped lay a
foundation for geopolitics as a ﬁeld of study, its geographic focus
on Eurasia illuminates the spatial boundary and parameters of
any economic ﬂows and political activities within and around the
broad region.
In his original formulation, Mackinder (1904) saw the large
landmass of Eurasia or the Heartland encompassing the river
basins of the Volga, Yenisey, Amu Darya, Syr Darya, and the
Caspian Sea as the Pivot of inﬂuence, from the planet’s central
location, on historical processes and geopolitical realities. The
geographic structure of the Pivot, Mackinder argued, could shield
it from attacks by sea powers, sustain large populations, and
produce some kind of collective (East European) identity and
unity. In 1919, Mackinder revised his theory in adapting to the
geopolitical realities by enlarging the Pivot/Heartland area to
include the Black and Baltic Sea basins or much of Eastern
Europe, which remained the key to his theory about the constant
importance and shifted parameters of the Heartland (see Ismailov
and Papava, 2010). Mackinder’s Heartland theory casts a broad
geographic net capturing much of today’s Central Asia that is
becoming a strategic bridge between Europe and China in light of
the latter’s BRI.
As with all grand theorizing of the past, Mackinder was critiqued and updated at both the geographic scale and from the
beneﬁt of hindsight from his time. Nicholas Spykman, a DutchAmerican geographer, accepted part of Mackinder’s premise but
offered alternative views. Relative to the Heartland, Spykman
(1944) coined the Rimland comprising the European Coastland,
Arab-Middle Eastern Desert land, and the Asiatic Monsoon Land.
He argued that the power of the Heartland could be kept in check
by the peripheral Rimland given the latter’s advantage in the
population, resources, and access to sea. Unlike Mackinder who
saw the Heartland as more powerful with its location advantages
over sea powers further beyond, Spykman asserted that Rimland
states like Japan, Britain, and China would likely become superpowers due to their access to sea and, therefore, greater contact
with the outside world.
Whether Spykman fully anticipated the rise of China as a
superpower decades later, he correctly identiﬁed the geographic
logic of access to sea as critical to understanding the advantages
and disadvantages of mostly landlocked countries in Central Asia
that have shaped their geostrategic constraints. True to their
disciplinary background, both Mackinder and Spykman made
essentially geographic deterministic arguments, yet their ideas
spawned the ﬁelds of geopolitical and diplomatic studies and
continue to resonate with developments in Eurasia today. If we
skirt around the narrow geographic determinism by situating
post-WWII geopolitical developments in the region’s hard spatial
constraints, we see the differential opportunities for Eastern
European and Central Asian nations to develop before and after
the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet independence has allowed these countries to pursue their own
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economic destinies by either reconnecting to and integrating with
Western Europe through the EU, as in the case of most East
European economies, or turning more to China for economic
cooperation as Central Asia (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009, 2013).
With a deeper look into the heavily geographic theories of
Mackinder and Spykman in light of the transition from the Soviet
to the post-Soviet era, we see the clearly shifted economic positions of the countries at the western and eastern end of Eurasia
(Eastern Europe and China, respectively), as well as those in the
intermediate region of Central Asia. This reminds us of the
problematic and dated categorization of Eurasia in the global
economy by other earlier theories. It is generally familiar that in
the now outdated Three-World scheme, the former East European socialist countries were labeled Second World and China
was part of the Third World. The World-Systems Theory tends to
classify the former as belonging to the semi-peripheral zone of the
tripartite world economy with the zone and periphery (Chirot,
1986) or an extra category of “others” (see Babones, 2005). While
China was solidly in the periphery before 1980 and rose to the
semi-periphery in the twenty-ﬁrst century, Frank (1998) contended that China had resurged to the center of gravity of
the world economy that it occupied for a long time before
the emergence of the capitalist world system in the sixteenth
century.
Unlike classical geographic and geopolitical theories of the
Heartland and/or the Rimland, Jeremy Black (2015), while staying with the geopolitical lens, sees the perception of power in its
spatial constraints as equally important as the structure and
execution of power. From this vantage point, there may not be
any real power in Central Asia today like when it was dominated
by the Timurid Empire during 1370–1405. Yet if the uneven and
relatively weak economic positions of the post-Soviet Central
Asian states have created some kind of vacuum for major power,
China, having risen or returned to Asia’s center of economic
gravity, is positioning to be that power by pushing the BRI to
forge direct and close connectivity with Europe through Central
Asia (Chen, 2018; Chen and Mardeusz, 2015). Unlike the times of
Mackinder and Spykman, China-led transcontinental Eurasian
Railway today ships goods overland to Europe through Central
Asia must faster than by sea, reducing the friction of long distance
over the landlocked countries in Central Asia. Having also created
extensive energy links from and through Central Asia, China’s
heavy inroads into the latter appears to scale up into a “New
Great Game” as a strong regional power.
Change and continuity in “The Great Game”. Seeing China play
a “New Great Game” in Central Asia today brings back an earlier
stretch of history predating Mackinder’s Heartland theory. The
original “Great Game” or what is classically known as “The Great
Game”, which started around 1830, marked an era of tension and
confrontation between the British Empire and the Russian
Empire in today’s Central Asia and South Asia. Despite the long
distance of over 3000 kms separating the two empires’ established
territories, they feared each other’s incursion into the other’s
comfort zones. Worrying about Russia’s intention to threaten its
crown colony of India from the north, Britain attempted to
control the Emirate of Afghanistan as a protectorate and then
create a larger buffer zone out of the Emirates of Bukhara and
Khiva, located in present-day Uzbekistan. Russia on the other
hand wanted Afghanistan as a neutral zone and pushed Britain
back. After several military conﬂicts including two Anglo-Afghan
wars, “The Great Game” came to a close in 1895 when the border
between the Russia Empire and Afghanistan was settled (see
Hopkirk, 1992). Those seven decades represented an extended era
of protracted great power rivalry in Central Asia (and South Asia)

that casts a long shadow over the current potential “New Great
Game” with China being the emerging lead player.
At ﬁrst sight, China appears to be the nineteenth-century
Britain in opposition to Russia, which continues to hold a strong
inﬂuence in Central Asia today as it did in the nineteenth century
despite having lost its political domination since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The fundamental difference
between then and now, however, is that China and Russia are the
two dominant power players vs. the weaker independent Central
Asian states, instead of being empires relative to a group of
colonies or small emirates. Yet Cooley (2014) saw a new “Great
Game” emerging with the continued involvement of the United
States against a newly aggressive Russia and a resource-hungry
China in Central Asia. The latter’s loss of Soviet patronage and
support in conjunction with its political corruption, social
instability, and economic weakness (see Rumer, 2002) have
created and sustained an open space for a new “Great Game”
played by external powers. Nevertheless, the Central Asian
leaders, as Cooley and Heathershaw (2017) show, are closely
connected to global power centers through business networks,
elite bank accounts, overseas courts, third-party brokers, and
Western lawyers. Similar to the political and diplomatic nature of
the original “Great Game,” the lingering geopolitical interests of
the United States and Russia have kept that game alive in a new
regional environment.
China has entered this new regional space with a primarily
geoeconomic strategy for promoting trade, securing energy
supplies, and building cross-border infrastructure. While trade
routes were involved as part of the original “Great Game,”
China’s major role in shaping regional and bilateral trade ties
across Central Asia has laid the ground for a new “Great Game.”
Having become the major partner, or at least one of the key
trading partners of each of the Central Asian state, China is the
largest trading partner with the whole region and has replaced
Russia’s earlier dominance in trade with Central Asia (Krasnopolsky, 2013). By launching the BRI in 2013 in Kazakhstan, China
has ramped and scaled up its geoeconomic strategy to make
Central Asia the crucial region for widening and deepening
overland trade and infrastructure ties to the larger Eurasia and
Europe. With almost all of the references to any new “Great
Game” appearing before 2013, the BRI not only has unleashed an
opportunity for China to engage with Central Asia for mutual
beneﬁts but also created a timely occasion for examining whether
China’s heavy involvement in Central Asia amounts to a real new
“Great Game.” This analysis focuses on a pair of China-Central
Asia connections that reﬂect the new geoeconomic realities absent
in the old “Great Game” of the nineteenth century.
The “Great Game” reference to the past and present Central
Asia also raises the question of how this vast region is being
increasingly affected by China differently than how the latter has
grown and extended its footprint and impact across the Global
South. While Central Asia is not generally seen as part of the
Global South, it ﬁts the topic of this themed session quite well for
two reasons. First, Central Asia, as a solid segment of the former
Soviet Union, shares the political, ideological, and economic
legacies of the state-socialist system and post-socialist transition
societies with China. Relative to these shared features, China’s
distinctive path of reform and opening and global rise now
through the BRI, coupled with border contiguity and geographic
proximity with Central Asia, justify the analysis of this region as
an integral part of the “China and the Global South” discourse.
Second, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s GDP per capita of
around $9000 is slightly higher than China’s due to their
abundant energy wealth and much smaller populations, per
capita GDP of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, averaging
less than $2500, is comparable to many countries of the Global
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South. Given this two-tiered comparability, it makes much sense
to bring these varied states and economies fully into an analysis of
China’s neighboring impact on them from a similar stage of
development, conventionally measured, yet from a much more
powerful position.
The strong China-Central Asia energy nexus
The ﬁrst connection concerns the transboundary energy nexus,
which is a compelling example of how China’s varied global and
regional development and engagement strategies are motivated by
its domestic economic and political conditions. The explosive and
sustained growth of China’s economy over the past three decades
has generated a huge need for imported energy and thus completely altered the global supply-demand equation. China’s
massive manufacturing machine and megacities have been running on historically unprecedented quantities of coal, oil, and
natural gas. From a country with no private cars to the largest
auto market in the world, China has dramatically accelerated its
gas consumption. With millions of skyscrapers and lower buildings of all kinds shooting up in its hundreds of large cities that
have to be cooled and heated, China has become a giant in the
overall consumption of energy by the world’s cities. As a result,
China has become world’s largest energy consumer in less than 20
years, accounting for almost 20% of the world’s total energy
consumption now.
The rapid growth of China’s demand for energy has far outstripped its domestic supply. China produced an estimated 4.3
million barrels per day (bbl/day) of oil liquids in 2011, which was
expected to rise to 4.5 million bbl/day by the end of 2013. China
produced an estimated 4.3 million barrels per day (bbl/day) of oil
liquids in 2011, and increased this production for 220 metric tons
(5093 bbl/day) in 2015, but its consumption rose by 16.4 metric
tons (379.6 bbl/day) in 2014.1 Its booming economy requires
China to import more than half of the oil it needs. According to
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China may
import about 75% of the crude oil it will consume by 2035. This
has turned China into the world’s largest importer of oil (16.7% of
the global crude oil imports in 2015), slightly ahead of the United
States at 16.5%,2 from being an oil exporter in the 1990s. Looking
forward, China’s energy demand is expected to expand 75% by
2035. Natural gas consumption in China has also risen over the
past decade. In 2011, China produced 3.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf)
of natural gas, 9% more than in 2010. While natural gas
accounted for 23.7% of global energy consumption in 2011, it was
only 4.5% in China. China’s gas import to jump from 12% of its
consumption in 2010 to 22% in 2011 (Fazilov and Chen, 2013).
China’s growing demand for energy has expanded its sources of
imports including Central Asia.
In 2011, the Middle East, including Iran, supplied 2.6 million
bbl/day (51%) to China, Africa 1.2 million bbl/day (24%), the
Asia-Paciﬁc region 173,000 bbl/day (3%), and other countries 1.1
million bbl/day (22%). China has become heavily dependent on a
number of countries in the Middle East and Africa with low
political stability. To ameliorate this dependence, China has
begun to diversify its international energy sources by sponsoring
the development of China-bound pipelines in Myanmar and
Central Asia. Meanwhile, the Central Asian vector of China’s
energy policy has become considerably more important, due to its
abundance of oil and natural gas deposits and relative regional
stability. Central Asia accounts for about 4% of global energy
deposits. The oil reserves in Central Asia and along the Caspian
Sea coast amount to 17 to 33 bbl/day with more unexploited
deposits. China has turned to Central Asia for energy supply, for
two main reasons. Besides accessing a more stable and closer
source of abundant energy, China aims to compete aggressively
4

for its energy security by developing its “energy diplomacy” with
the region. Secondly, developing close ties with Central Asia
through an energy nexus helps China deter threats from the
separatist activists in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
China has reorganized the army units in Xinjiang to safeguard its
oil ﬁelds given the 3300 km western border with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
The root of connections between the Central Asian countries
and China goes all the way back to the Silk Road times. Diplomatic relations between China and the Central Asian countries
have been established since 1991. Trade between China and the
ﬁve Central Asian countries rose from $527 million in 1992 to
$40 billion in 2011.3 In Central Asia, China has sought to
establish a regional free trade zone, partially as a way of tapping
into the region’s vast energy resources. Nowadays, the major
Chinese energy players in the region are China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
(SINOPEC) and Petro China. They have partnered with local
companies to compete with traditional power players like Russia
and multinational companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobile, and
BP in the exploration and extraction of oil and natural gas
(Fazilov and Chen, 2013). CNPC has brought some competitive
advantages to this partnership from its domestic oil and gas
exploration and development such as specialty engineering,
technical support, and service teams. In one project, CNPC
implemented three strategies; horizontal wells, water injection
and recovery efﬁciency enhancement, trying to inject water of
good quality and great quantity (Hu, 2014).
Two main pipelines from Central Asia to China, the Central
Asia-China gas pipeline and Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, are
already in operation. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline,
spanning Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, and
crossing Xingjian at the border town of Horgos, transported 40
billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas when it was ﬁrst built. It
is connected with China’s second west-east gas pipeline, which
starts from Horgos and ends in Hong Kong, stretching 8704 km.
China imported about 18.4 bcm of natural gas through its ﬁrst
cross-border pipeline the last 2 years. Given China’s plan to
increase gas imports from Central Asia by ﬁve times by 2015, the
Central Asia-China pipeline’s capacity will expand up to 55–60
billion cubic meters of gas per year.4 Upon the possible addition
of Line D (see below), the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline will
have an annual deliverability of 85 billion cubic meters, the largest
gas transmission system in Central Asia.
The Sino-Kazakhstan energy ties. With its massive oil reserves,
Kazakhstan is most attractive to China for energy cooperation.
Kazakhstan’s total proven offshore and onshore ﬁelds’ reserves
constitute about 37 billion barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic
meters (tcm) of natural gas, making Kazakhstan one of the
world’s major oil producers with the potential to expand the
production of 2 million bbl/day in 2010 to 3.5 million bbl/day by
2015. Kazakhstan’s reserves of natural gas are around 8.6 tcm.
Chinese energy companies have been operating and investing
in Kazakhstan where CNPC acquired 60.3% of shares of Kazakh
oil company Aktobemunaigaz in 1997. CNPC later bought the
entire shares of the company and re-established
CNPC–Aktobemunaigaz. In addition, CNPC acquired a 49%
minority stake in Kazakhstan’s AO MangistauMunaigaz Company from KazMunaiGaz. This deal gives China control over
about 15% of Kazakhstan’s total oil output.5
The discovery of Kazakhstan’s giant Kashagan oil ﬁeld, which
was considered “the largest oil discovery anywhere in the world in
the past 20 years,” has prompted China to reconsider its position
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Fig. 1 Central Asia-China oil and gas pipelines. This image is not covered by a CC-BY lisense.

regarding the feasibility of Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. As a
result, the easternmost part of the pipeline, running 988 kms from
Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alataw Pass (Alashankou in Chinese
Pinyin spelling) at the Chinese border (see Fig. 1), was completed
at the end of 2005 and began operating in May 2006, with a total
investment of $700 million.6 The 962 km-long pipeline has been
operating as a 50–50 joint venture between state companies
CNPC and KazMunaiGaz. At the beginning, this pipeline was
expected to ship one million barrels per day of crude oil into
western China or 10 million tons of crude oil per year, but the
pipeline is expected to increase its export capacity to 20 million
tons in the future. Kazakhstan and China have considered two
more opportunities. One is to prolong the existing pipeline
between cities of Uzbekistan-Bukhara and Tashkent to Almaty,
then through Taldikorgan to Alashankou. The other is the
construction of a new gas pipeline connecting Ishim (western
Siberia) and Alashankou and the one going through Astana and
Karaganda.
China considers Kazakhstan a key source and link in its energy
security nexus, and sees the cooperation as helping strengthen
and secure its northwestern borders of a restive Xinjiang. The
cooperation also provides new energy to support China’s “Go
West” program and helps it gain greater access to the markets of
Central Asia. Some experts see the increasing Sino-Kazakh
cooperation in the energy ﬁeld as tied to the long-term strategic
interests of the two countries, especially when faced with greater
U.S. military presence in Central Asia after 11 September. For
Kazakhstan, China can help diversify its energy sector by
balancing against Russia’s inﬂuence in its energy ﬁeld (Fazilov
and Chen, 2013).
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in China’s energy calculus.
Turkmenistan is one of the world’s largest natural gas exporters.

According to Oil and Gas Journal, Turkmenistan has proven
natural gas reserves of approximately 265 trillion cubic feet (tcf)
in 2012. The abundance of natural gas has drawn signiﬁcant
attention and interest from China. Diplomatic relations between
two countries were established after the independence of Turkmenistan in 1992. Given the signiﬁcant energy component in
their bilateral relations, the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline
project—as part of the Central Asia-China pipeline—came into
existence. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline begins in Turkmenistan and goes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before
connecting to a second pipeline running west to east within
China (see Fig. 2). China and Turkmenistan signed an agreement
in July 2007 under which the latter would supply 30 bcm of gas to
China annually through pipelines for 30 years. It began supplying
gas on 14 December 2009. According to CNPC, Turkmenistan
has transported more than 30 bcm of natural gas to China in
more than 900 days using the Central Asia-China pipeline, an
amount making up a ﬁfth of the gas China used in 2011. Of the
30 bcm, about 10.7 bcm came from the CNPC (Turkmenistan)
Amu Darya River Gas Co, and Turkmenistan’s Natural Gas
Konzern supplied the remaining 19.3 bcm.7
The evolution of energy cooperation between China and
Turkmenistan should beneﬁt both sides. Turkmenistan beneﬁts
from doubling its energy supply to China and circumventing its
biggest competitors—Iran and Russia. Beijing wins by securing
new gas supplies and thus postpones plans to deal with Iran until
the political climate of the Middle East improves. According to
IEA, China’s natural gas import will be around 30–40 bcm, and
this amount could be covered by. Turkmenistan with its 60 bcm
annual export capacity. China’s consumption will lie in the range
of 180 bcm to 200 bcm, and production in the range of 120 bcm
to 140 bcm by 2020. Based on this assumption, the gap between
demand and domestic production by 2020 will amount to
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Fig. 2 China’s West-to-East natural gas line. This image is not covered by a CC-BY lisense.

between 40 bcm and 80 bcm.8 This will reinforce China’s interest
and need to buy more gas from Turkmenistan.
Like with other Central Asian countries, China’s overall
relationship with Uzbekistan has developed over the last two
decades, which has contributed to a deeper and more mutually
beneﬁcial cooperation in energy. According to Oil and Gas
Journal, Uzbekistan holds an estimated 65 tcf of proven natural
gas reserves as of 2012, ranking it the fourth highest in the
Eurasia region and nineteenth in the world.9 To gain access to
this rich gas reserve, China has made major economic inroads
into Uzbekistan where it has set up more than 380 ventures with
Chinese investment and also the representative ofﬁces of 65 large
Chinese companies; among them, CITIC, CNPC, and China
Machinery. The twin anchors of this cooperation are Uzbekistan’s
national oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz and Chinese CNPC.
In 2004, CNPC signed a contract with Uzbekneftegaz on energy
cooperation. In 2006, they signed two more agreements to explore
and develop prospective petroleum deposits in ﬁve onshore
blocks of the Aral Sea. A joint venture on oil exploration between
Uzbekneftegas and CNPC was established in the Mingbulak ﬁeld.
The intersection of the Uzbekistan-China gas pipeline into the
Central Asia-China gas pipeline has added momentum to energy
cooperation between the two countries. Uzbekistan started to
supply natural gas through this gas pipeline on August 2012. As
the China-Central Asia pipeline is a double-line pipeline,
including Line A and line B, the construction of Line C with a
length of 1840 kms to parallel Lines A and B was launched in
2012 (see Fig. 1), including a 157 km-long project undertaking by
6

the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau. The 3-line gas pipeline of
Uzbekistan-China is projected to have a capacity of 25 bcm gas.10
This ambitious gas project adds to the bilateral economic
relations between China and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan gains by
attracting Chinese investment to its energy sector with spillovers
to other sectors of its economy.
While the China-Central Asia energy nexus has broadened, it
has experienced a recent setback. The fourth branch of China’s
far-ﬂung pipeline (planned as Line D) system to carry gas from
Turkmenistan through neighboring Uzbekistan (see Fig. 1),
which was approved in 2013, has been put off indeﬁnitely after
two delays. If this largest planned link in China’s supply network
from Central Asia has been canceled, it reﬂects the declines in
global energy prices and China’s lower economic growth. Even
though China’s gas consumption grew 5.6% in 2014, 3.6% in
2015, and 8% in 2016, it pales in comparison to the double-digit
growth over the 2000s. In fact, research by CNPC predicts that
China could face a gas surplus of 50 billion cubic meters (bcm) a
year by 2020 due to long-term contracts for imports of liqueﬁed
natural gas (LNG) and pipeline expansion plan.11
As seen from above, China’s heavy investment in Central
Asia’s energy has been driven by its domestic economic growth.
Through geographic proximity and overland piping, China has
been able to secure this energy ﬂow over long distances to power
its manufacturing and megacities all the way on the east coast.
However, recent economic slowdown has posted a new challenge
to the Chinese government, which had pushed CNPC to make big
investments in the China-Central Asia system in light of the BRI,
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but failed to devise a pricing policy that would avoid losses on gas
imports. While this threatens the short-term stability and mutual
beneﬁts of the China-Central Asia energy nexus, it does not alter
the fact that China has solidiﬁed Central Asia as an abundant
long-term source of energy supply. As over the recent past,
China’s domestic economic performance and its demand for
external energy will continue to shape its need for Central Asia’s
oil and gas. The Belt-side of the BRI further ensures this prospect.
From China to Europe through Central Asia
Besides securing a major energy supply source in Central Asia,
China has through the BRI widened its engagement with and
through the region as an integral strategy and broad land bridge
for (re)connecting with Europe along the old Silk Road. This
perceived and actually growing role for Central Asia constitutes
the key geoeconomic arena where China is exerting a wideranging and multidirectional inﬂuence as the emerging dominant
Eurasian power. This inﬂuence is both direct and indirect,
through new investment projects and railroad connections. It not
only touches and traverses key cities in Central Asia but also
extends all the way into the periphery and core of Eastern and
Western Europe. By elongating its heavy footprint from deep
inside its domestic economic space to the far-ﬂung corners of
Europe via the vast in-between region of Central Asia, China
presses us to re-evaluate the relative merits of the Heartland vs.
the Rimland in classical geopolitical theories reviewed earlier. In
addition, it elevates the specter of a new “Great Game” on the
horizon.
The rise of the Trans-Eurasian railroad. In thinking about
China-Europe connectivity today, transport infrastructure may
not immediately rise to top importance due to the long distance
between them and Europe’s own well connected transport networks. China has built more highways, railroads, and bridges

than any other country over the past two decades. Armed with
this engineering expertize and construction experience, China has
been building an extensive transport and municipal infrastructure
projects in some of its Asian neighbors and faraway African
countries (Chen and Su, 2014). More recently, China has also
begun to create and strengthen its long-distance railroad connections to Europe, aiming to expand the overland movement of
their traded goods, under the BRI. In light of the long distance
and multiple countries and borders along the way, China’s effort
to transport more goods to Europe by railroad is very ambitious,
and critically dependent on having a smooth and linked rail
passage through Central Asia. One challenge is to transfer train
cargo from China at international borders of Kazakhstan and
Russia efﬁciently by moving containers to awaiting trains that
relay the cargo to European trains. While these transfers take
time, they are necessary due to the different track gauges of
China, the former Soviet countries, and Europe.12
China-Europe rail connections have multiplied rapidly over the
past few years as the BRI has been further implemented. The ﬁrst
train along the Trans-Eurasia Railroad made all the way to
Europe from China in March 2011. Leaving from the city of
Chongqing in southwestern China, the train exits Alashankou
between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, and moves through Russia,
Belarus, and Poland over 11,179 kms before arriving in the
German city of Duisburg (see Fig. 3). In a reverse and reciprocal
way as bringing oil and gas from Central Asia to China, the
launch of a railroad line to Europe was strongly motivated by
changing factors of production inside China. As labor and land
costs in coastal cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen have gone up a
lot, the Chinese government has been pushing and inducing
foreign investors and domestic producers to move inland through
its “Go West” policy ofﬁcially unveiled in 2000. Interior
megacities like Chongqing and Chengdu have been booming as
major destinations for large new manufacturing projects. Having

Fig. 3 The Trans-Eurasian Railroad (The Chongqing-Duisburg Line). Source: Drawn by Mustafa Ibraheem
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Source: Tabulated from information compiled by Yina Zhang, Fudan University, Shanghai.
Notes: Lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 exit Alataw Pass (Alashankou) on Xinjiang’s border with Kazakhstan and go through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Germany, and Line 7 moves on to France and Spain. Line 8, 9, and 11 exit China via the land port of Manzhouli in Inner
Mongolia and connects to the Trans-Siberian Railway via Chita before reaching Biklyan in central Russia

Travel time
15 days
14 days
15 days
15 days
15 days
18 days
21 days
–
–
12 days
–
Distance
11,000 kilometers
9965 kilometers
10,245 kilometers
11,200 kilometers
10,700 kilometers
11,808 kilometers
13,052 kilometers
6578 kilometers
9820 kilometers
–
11,500 kilometers
Launch date
19 March 2011
26 April 2013
18 July 2013
29 September 2013
24 October 2012
30 October 2012
18 November 2014
–
–
–
–
Destination city
Duisburg, Germany
Lodz, Poland
Hamburg, Germany
Warsaw, Poland
Czech and Polish cities
Duisburg, Germany
Madrid, Spain
Moscow, Russia
Hamburg, Germany
Antwerp, Belgium
Moscow, Russia
Departing city
Chongqing, China
Chengdu, China
Zhengzhou, China
Suzhou, China
Wuhan, China
Changsha, China
Yiwu, China
Harbin, China
Harbin, China
Xining, China
Guangzhou, China
Lines
1. Chongqing-Duisburg
2. Chengdu-Lodz
3. Zhengzhou-Hamburg
4. Suzhou-Warsaw
5. Wuhan-The Czech Republic and Poland
6. Changsha-Duisburg
7. Yiwu-Madrid
8. Harbin-Moscow
9. Harbin-Hamburg
10. Xining-Antwerp
11. Guangzhou-Moscow

Table 1 Trans-continental rail lines between China and Europe through Central Asia

set up what would be Asia’s largest laptop factory in Chongqing,
U.S. computer giant Hewlett Packard has already shipped more
than four million notebook computers to Europe by the
Chongqing-Duisburg rail line since 2011 (Chen and Mardeusz,
2015).
The Chongqing-Duisburg line has been followed by the
inauguration of several other China-driven originated rail lines
that now link different economic centers across China to multiple
destinations in Europe and also in Russia and part of the Middle
East, thus creating a more expansive Trans-Eurasian rail-based
land bridge. Only 270 kms northwest of Chongqing, the megacity
of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, became the second
starting point China’s Europe-bound cargo trains via Central
Asia. On 26 April 2013, Chengdu’s ﬁrst train to Europe arrived in
the central Polish city of Łódź, where the Presidents of both
China and Poland met an arriving train on 20 June 2016 to give
this rain route the highest-level ofﬁcial blessing. Like the
Chongqing-Duisburg line, this train carries IT products as
China’s main export to Europe as both Chongqing and Chengdu
have become China’s major hubs for IT products like laptops and
semiconductors (see Table 1). In 2016 alone, Chengdu ran 460
trains to Europe and 60 trains to Central Asia, carrying 73,000
tons of cargo worth $1.56 billion.13 Beginning in 2017, Chengdu
also sent trains to Tiburg in the Netherlands and Nuremburg in
Germany, as well as to Moscow and Istanbul, which has increased
the projected annual number of trains runs from Chengdu to over
1000.
The China-driven Eurasian Railroad has multiplied and spun
off more lines as its geographic starting points have shifted east
inside China to include a growing number of cities across a more
expansive territory. On 18 July 2013, a new rail line originated
from the city of Zhengzhou in central China reached Germany’s
largest port city of Hamburg, again through Central Asia
(Kazakhstan), Russia, Belarus, and Poland. This line has since
been carrying car tires, high-end clothing, stationaries, and
artistic products from the provinces of Henan (where Zhengzhou
is located), Shandong, Zhejiang, and Fujian, along China’s eastern
seaboard. On 29 March 2013, a cargo train left the city of Suzhou
near Shanghai and arrived in Warsaw through Russia and
Belarus. This line has specialized in shipping products like
laptops, circuit boards, liquid-crystal displays, and hard drives
from the IT manufacturing hub of Suzhou and it surrounding
region. On 18 November 2014, an 82-container freight train left
the eastern industrial city of Yiwu, China’s largest wholesale
center for small consumer goods (Chen, 2015), and pulled in
Madrid after 21 days marking the longest route taken by a freight
train. Given the huge demand for China-made consumer goods
in Europe, the Yiwu-Madrid rail line has created a special direct
link between China’s primary sourcing center for small
merchandise and its many markets in Europe (see Table 1).
Following the start of a train line to Tehran (see Table 2), Yiwu
originated a new line on 13 August 2016 to the Russian city of
Chelyabinskaya, a hub city on the Trans-Siberian Railway near
the border with Kazakhstan. After 8 days through Central Asia,
the train arrived with 100 standard containers ﬁlled with small
merchandise, which is in high demand in Russia.14
A simple cost-beneﬁt analysis shows the advantages of shipping
goods overland from China to Europe. First, it takes a quarter to
half of the time to move train cargo from China to Europe it takes
to send them by sea, although the latter is cheaper. Train shipping
also costs up to 65% less than shipping by air. While many
industries and companies would wait for 1 to 2 months for ocean
freight, a growing sector of high-tech and high-end fashion
companies needs certain parts and essential equipment as fast
and as cheap as possible.15 For examples, about 60% of the material
inputs for laptops and 30% of the ﬁnished laptops depend on rail

Main cargo
IT products (i.e., laptops)
IT products
Consumer products (e.g., clothing)
IT products (from near Shanghai)
Consumer electronics (from central China)
–
Small merchandise
Products from northeastern China
Products from northeastern China
Local products from western China (Tibet)
Consumer electronics (from southern China)
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Source: Tabulated from information compiled by Yina Zhang, Fudan University, Shanghai.
Notes: Almost of these train lines go west through the border towns and outposts of Horgos or Alataw Pass (Alashankou) in Xinjiang into Central Asia. Line 5 enters Hairatan, Afghanistan from neighboring Uzbekistan over the Afghanistan–Uzbekistan Friendship Bridge built by
the former Soviet Union in 1982. Line 8 enters northeastern Iran at the land port of Sarakhs bordering Turkmenistan and then runs west to Tehran. Line 9 continues on from Hairatan to Mazar-i-Sharif inside Afghanistan over a 74-kilometer-long rail line ﬁnanced by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and completed in 2012

Departing city
Lianyungang, China
Xian, China
Hefei (Anhui), China
Wuwei (Gansu), China
Nantong (Jiangsu), China
Xiamen (Fujian), China
Xintai (Hebei), China
Yiwu, China
Yiwu, China
Nanjing, China
Yinchuan, China
Lines
1. Lianyungang-Almaty
2. Xian-Almaty
3. Hefei-Almaty
4. Wuwei-Almaty
5. Nantong-Afghanistan
6. Xiamen-Turkmenistan
7. Xintai-Tashkent
8. Yiwu-Tehran
9. Yiwu-Afghanistan
10. Nanjing-Central Asia
11. Ningxia-Central Asia

Table 2 China-Central Asia rail lines

Destination city
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Hairatan, Afghanistan
Turkmenistan
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Tehran, Iran
Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan
Central Asian countries
Kyrgyzstan

Launch date
25 February 2015
28 November 2013
26 June 2014
12 December 2014
25 August 2016
July 2015
------

Distance
5600 kilometers
3866 kilometers
4954 kilometers
2646 kilometers
-11,808 kilometers
5000 kilometers
10,399 kilometers
7500 kilometers
-5935 kilometers

Travel time
10 days
6 days
8 days
5 days
-5 days
8 days
14 days
15 days
12 days
15 days

Main cargo
Electronic products
Machinery
IT and household goods
Household electronics
Textiles and consumer goods
Construction material
Local products
Small merchandise
Small merchandise
-Rubber, steel
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transport. Bringing them in and out from the Chinese city of
Chongqing by sea is expensive and time-consuming. It requires a
long train ride to Shanghai or Hong Kong from where containers
are shipped to Europe (Chen and Mardeusz, 2015). Yet
transcontinental rail lines can neither compete with ocean freight
on price nor with air shipping on time (Chen, 2018). They are
ultimately an in-between mode of long-distance transportation in
terms of transit time and shipping cost.16
Destined for Central Asia and beyond. By connecting a growing
number of Europe-bound cargo trains from various cities in
China, Central Asia has become an increasingly important inbetween regional space for transport logistics and relaying hubs.
Providing the inevitable transit routes, Kazakhstan stands out as
the most important Central Asian country for bringing China and
Europe closer together and more linked via long-distance overland trade. This recent re-centering of Central Asia has been
enhanced further by the entire region becoming the destination
for an alternative set of train lines that originate from multiple
cities and regions in China. While Kazakhstan (and its former
capital of Almaty) remains the most popular ﬁnal destination for
these trains, the rest of Central Asia and its neighboring countries
like Iran and Afghanistan have begun to receive and relay them,
thus widening China-Central Asian trade into an even larger
region known as “inner Asia” that partially overlaps with but
stretches beyond Central Asia.
One Central Asia-bound train from China started from the
port city of Lianyungang on the eastern seaboard on 25 February
2015. Starting out, this line would run west through the border
city of Horgos in Xinjiang to reach Almaty over 10 days. After
some early runs, the travel time has shrunk to about 6 days. It has
carried electronic products and machine equipment made by
Japanese and Korean companies in the broad region near
Lianyungang and medical equipment, pottery products, and
aluminum products from other manufacturers (see Table 2). On
return, this train brings back non-ferrous metal from the mines in
Kazakhstan. Line 6 originates from a free trade zone in Xiamen
on China’s southeastern coast, exits Xinjiang, and goes through
Central Asia to touch Turkmenistan. Carrying construction
materials, shoes and garments, foodstuffs, and other consumer
goods from Xiamen, this train line has greatly facilitated exports
from one of China’s coastal manufacturing hubs under the BRI.
Besides being the end points for China’s exports, Central Asia
states have begun to channel and relay the broader range of
China’s trade with the West and South Asian countries bordering
Central Asia. Like a number of trains heading to Europe, Line 8
originates from Yiwu going west, exits Alashankou into
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, enters Iran’s land port of Sarakhs,
and then turns west to reach Tehran. It delivers a variety of
consumer goods that ﬁll the stores and bazaars throughout Iran’s
capital city (Kāzemi and Chen, 2014). Line 9 follows the same
route all the way through Kazakhstan where it heads south into
Uzbekistan and then reaches Hairatan before arriving in Mazar-eSharif, Afghanistan, one of the country’s most populated and
developed northern cities.
Located at the crossroads of Central and South Asia, between
India in the South and Russia in the North, Afghanistan is
potentially a critical part of China’s westward trade and
investment network under the BRI. While Afghanistan’s great
need for infrastructure is a new opportunity for China’s outward
investment, its vast natural resources appeal to China. In fact,
China has begun to ﬁnd ways to involve Afghanistan in the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a lynchpin of the
BRI (see Chen, Joseph, and Tariq, 2018). However, China is
concerned about the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups
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in Afghanistan due to their possible links with the Muslim
population in Xinjiang. The deadly Taliban attack on an Afghan
army base in Mazar-e-Sharif in April 2017, which killed over
100 soldiers, only reminds of the danger for China to conduct
business in Afghanistan. Through an anti-terrorism alliance with
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan to tackle the threat of
terrorism, China has recently announced $70 million of military
aid to support the Afghan government’s anti-terrorism efforts
(Stanzel, 2017). In light of these security concerns in Afghanistan,
sending a train all the way there marks China’s bold and farreaching attempt to revive the old Silk Road through creating
broader trade and infrastructure links beyond and from Central
Asia. This reminds us of Afghanistan’s central geopolitical
importance in the original “Great Game” (Hopkirk, 1992).
The geographic focal point for facilitating China-Central Asia
trade and train links is an emerging cross-border economic zone
anchored jointly to the land port of Horgos on the Chinese
(Xinjiang) and the Kazakh border city of Khorgos on the opposite
side. A transit point on the ancient Silk Road in the Tang Dynasty,
Horgos marked a closed border after the Russian Revolution in
1917 until 1983 when it reopened for very limited trade. The
establishment of a free trade zone in 2012 ushered in a new era for
Horgos, as a railroad port for restricted operation and as the
location for the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to pass through
into China (see earlier). Following China’s launch of the BRI in
2013, Horgos was upgraded to a city that now covers an area of
about 1900 square kilometers, with a population of about 85,000. In
2016, the Chinese government fully opened the Horgos railway port
and invested $289 million in completing the ﬁrst stage of the
90,000-square-meter port station. Formally called the International
Center for Boundary Cooperation (ICBC), the ﬁve square kilometer
free trade zone covering both sides of the border hosts, on the
Chinese side, a several giant, four-story, wholesale markets
containing hundreds of small shops and booths rented by
individual vendors (Chen, 2018). Kazakh buyers from Almaty
roam these booths to comparatively shop consumer goods like toys
or specialized items like hair wigs among many almost identical
vendors.17 This scene is quite similar to the large number of
international buyers, especially from the Middle East roaming the
gigantic hall of small merchandise vendors in Yiwu (Chen, 2015),
only on a much smaller scale. On the Kazakh side of the border is a
5740 hectare special economic zone that is modeled off of the Jebel
Ali Free Trade Zone in Dubai. It, however, has not yet taken the
intended scale and form, paling in comparison to its counterpart in
Horgos. By scaling up cross-border economic transactions over
outstretched borderlands, small border cities like Horgos have
emerged as a new kind of in-between space that brings together
previously unconnected actors and pushes out longer and wider
mobilities of capital, goods, and labor (Chen and Stone, 2017).
As Horgos has grown into a small border trade outpost and a
critical transshipment hub for more Eurasian train lines, it has also
begun to attract growing manufacturing and warehousing
industries, a few of which all the way from China’s dominant
manufacturing coast. Based in Shenzhen, Boshihao Electronics has
moved a portion of its production to Horgos where it plans to
produce 10,000 industrial robots per year, which will be destined
for export to Silk Road countries in Central Asia, Russia, and the
Middle East. Costing between $700 and $150,000 each, these
industrial robots are high-value merchandise that can be shipped
fast by train to Europe in roughly 10 days at a fraction of the cost
of air as their weight also makes air shipping prohibitively
expensive.18 In addition, as rising costs continue to drive
manufacturing activities to the deep interior and even remote
border locations like Horgos, it makes less sense to move products
overland east just to load them onto ships to ultimately go west. If
a remote city like Horgos can combine the functions of some local
10

manufacturing and strong logistics for cross-border trains, it has a
high potential to become a new overland gateway for China’s
west-oriented BRI despite its landlocked position (Chen, 2018).
Geoeconomic re-centering for a “New Great Game”?
With the theoretical point of departure being Mackinder’s
Heartland thesis for this paper, the empirical analysis of China’s
important economic and physical inﬂuence through and into
Central Asia leads us to rethink and rebalance the assumption
and orientation of classical geopolitical theorizing about the status
and role of the vast region between Europe and Asia. While
Mackinder and Spykman differed in how broadly they saw as the
geographic scope of the Eurasian landmass’ importance (Heartland vs. Rimland) to Britain’s and America’s diplomatic interests,
they shared a similar geopolitical orientation and approach to the
region. Having built several energy pipelines from Central Asia
and many train lines to Europe, China has almost unilaterally
shifted the understanding of Central Asia away from the geopolitical end to the geoeconomic side. Moreover, the cumulative
force of these transboundary pipelines and train lines has begun
to re-center Central Asia as the crucial middle or in-between
regional space for China to push forward the new Belt-half of the
BRI in reaching more parts and points of Europe and the Middle
East. The extension of China’s overland inﬂuence over larger
territories to its west also gives more credence to Spykman’s
alternative conception of the Rimland including China as a partial
sea power. To enrich the continued debate about the theoretical
legacy of Mackinder one century later (Megoran, 2004), China’s
key role in re-centering Central Asia injects a bevy of timely
evidence and insight for understanding the complex realities
surrounding an ancient land today. It sensitizes us to re-evaluate
both the connected and blurred boundaries between: (a) geopolitical and geoeconomic imperatives; (b) the rise of and pivot to
China and the relative decline of old Eurasian powers like Britain
and Russia (Hopkirk, 1992); (c) domestic economic growth and
external development strategy; and (d) the uneven autonomous
role of key cities vs. the general weakening of the nation-state
(Chen, 2005; Chen and Stone, 2017).
These points of renewed research and debate have updated the
view of early Heartland scholars that China was a mere geoeconomic rice and cereal grain producer. Far beyond its limited
historical position and role, China has been driving a new set of
economic and infrastructure connections in both directions
across Central Asia. In the eastern direction, China has secured
the ﬂow of oil and gas through several long-distance pipelines
from as far as Turkmenistan in the west all the way to its eastern
seaboard. Relative to its largest source of oil in the Middle East
that has to be shipped by sea, China has won a large share of the
energy prize in Central Asia through shorter overland pipelines.
In fact, China has relegated the United States to a second-tier
energy players in Central Asia where its private oil companies,
large as they are like ExxonMobil, do not match up against
China’s powerful state-owned oil giants such as CNPC (Fazilov
and Chen, 2013). Besides oil and gas from Central Asia, China
also beneﬁts from the region’s uranium reserves, renewable
energy, and quartz sand deposits that are essential to the Chinese
solar cell industry. Relative to the more limited spatial scopes of
Britain vs. Russia’s diplomatic and military maneuvering during
the original “Great Game,” China’s impact within and through
Central Asia has reached the scale and depth that may trigger a
new “Great Game” with receding but still strong powers like
Russia and the United States. This is a more likely scenario if
Central Asia ends up being a new buffer zone between China and
Russia, especially when most Central Asian residents still prefer
Russia to China (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009).
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While the original “Great Game” carried a negative connotation regarding the territories controlled by both the British and
Russian Empires, can a new “Great Game” featuring China as the
key player produce a different set of outcomes for all parties
concerned? In the western direction, China’s many Europe and
Central Asia-bound trains have created a wide opening and
channel for extending and accelerating its trade. They have also
facilitated China’s “Go West” development strategy by inducing
more manufacturing companies to relocate production from the
coastal region to cheaper interior cities, which in turn can foster
more balanced regional development. At the same time, cargo
trains originating from cities like Yiwu and Xiamen in the coastal
region have beneﬁted Central and South Asian and Middle
Eastern economies more directly as the latter’s large orders for
China-made consumer goods can be shipped faster and cheaper
by land. In addition, the more frequent runs of these trains, which
lower the average freight cost, make it possible for smaller
manufacturers and logistics companies, especially those clustered
around Yiwu (Chen, 2015) to move partially full containers
instead of waiting to ﬁll them completely. In another overland
connection beyond China and Central Asia, the ongoing project
of CPEC from Gwadar Port on the Indian Ocean to the border
city of Kashgar in Xinjiang, if successfully completed and
operational, will add the fastest access to sea for China’s landlocked northwestern region and its Central Asian neighbors
(Chen, Joseph, and Tariq, 2018).
While the China-Central Asia nexus brings about mutual
beneﬁts for both sides and beyond, it confronts various economic,
political, and spatial constraints. China’s recent slower economic
growth has produced uncertainty and less revenue for the oil and
gas rich and dependent Central Asia as exempliﬁed by the recent
cancelation of a planned gas pipeline (Line D, see earlier) from
Turkmenistan. While the growing number of Europe-bound
trains has boosted China’s overland exports, some of these trains
only bring partially full cargo back to China, thus introducing and
sustaining an imbalance to the bi-directional ﬂow of ChinaEurope freight. Some of the Chinese cities originating these trains
have had to subsidize the operation. As the income and purchasing power of large interior Chinese cities like Chongqing and
Chengdu rise, it has begun to create a market for European wine,
cheese, chocolates, and luxury cars carried by the trains from
Europe returning to and passing by these cities. Despite and
because of its vase size, Central Asia has a relatively small number
of large cities (except for the few capital cities like Almaty and
Tashkent) that can function as regional hubs relative to the heavy
concentration and clustering of large cities in both western Europe and East Asia, at the two ends of the old and new Silk Road.
Within Central Asia, “Sinophobia” may inhibit the further
expansion of China’s trade and investment in the region. Evidence includes isolated riots in Kyrgyzstan against Chinese
workers who allegedly had more privileged working conditions
over domestic workers and a ﬁght between Kazakh and Chinese
workers of Aktogay copper mine in Kazakhstan on 8 July 2015
involving 145 people, 65 of whom were injured and hospitalized.19 On the other hand, the Central Asian states suffer from
some corruption, nepotism, and a lack of transparency, contributing to their slow economic development that characterized
the old Heartland (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013). Given their
declined oil and gas revenues, the Central Asian governments
may be less capable of keeping up the maintenance of the through
rail lines, most of which were built by and dependent on Sovietera capital investment. A common challenge for both China and
Central Asia is to maintain the long-distance cross-border oil and
gas pipelines in severely continental climate zones as sections of
these pipelines were built during the Soviet era and with less
advanced construction technologies such as welding. Another risk

to China’s cooperation with Central Asia including Afghanistan
and Pakistan is the terrorist element that is potentially linked to
Xinjiang. In opening up and widening more lines of cooperation
in Central Asia, China is always concerned about its border
security, which in turn assures stable economic relations with its
western neighbors (Scott and Alcenat, 2008).
The Central Asian states, on the other hand, are uncomfortably
varied and even divergent in how to deal with the growing Chinese migration and potential formation of Chinese enclaves in
their capital cities. More speciﬁcally, Chinese migrants work with
Chinese and Kazakh construction companies as engineers and
technicians, not necessarily competing with locals, while Chinese
retailers in Kyrgyzstan compete with local petty trader. Therefore,
Central Asia ﬁnds itself in a paradoxical situation since it has both
labor surpluses and shortages, yet its own population is emigrating to look for better working opportunities in Russia (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009: p. 60). If Chinese migration into
Central Asia accelerates under the BRI, which is highly likely, it
challenges the Central Asian governments to more carefully
weigh the costs and beneﬁts of involving Chinese workers given
their respective demographic and economic conditions and then
adapt their immigration and border control policies accordingly.
Given the co-existence and tension between these new
opportunities and barriers for China-Central Asia cooperation,
China appears to be in the driver’s seat to shape how the relative
balance between opportunities and obstacles will play out for both
sides and their bordering states and regions. The scale and scope
of China’s economic and infrastructure activities in Central Asia
and its neighbors is too broad not to affect a large swath of the
region. The large number of train lines destined for Europe
through Central Asia and also the latter constitutes a powerful
geoeconomic force pulling the gravity of the Chinese economy
westward inside China and then pushing its inﬂuence out to
existing and new market destinations. The closer intertwining
between China’s changing domestic economy and global strategy
under the BRI is complicated further by its shared interests and
problems with Central Asia, which could turn the China-Central
Asia nexus into a vassal relationship characterized by crossborder investment by China for border security and political
stability (Swanström, 2005). This scenario could fall back to the
unequal relationship between the British and Russian Empires
and their controlled territories during the original “Great Game.”
Regardless of the prospect, China through the BRI is deep in
playing a “New Great Game” in Central Asia that differs considerably from its historical precedent about 150 years ago when
Britain and Russia jostled with each other on the Eurasian
steppes. If Russia was able to bring the Kazakh(stan) steppe zone
in the north under its control during the 1800s, China’s geoeconomically oriented BRI in the twenty-ﬁrst century is played out
from the Kazakh steppe to the “Eurasian desert zone” further
south and East-Central Europe further west. The long-term
outcome can only reﬂect how the still rising China will and can
handle the new opportunities vs. the existing obstacles across the
vast Eurasian landmass on which a China-pushed, re-centered
Central Asia may (re)emerge sooner than later
Received: 8 May 2017 Accepted: 14 May 2018
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1 Data calculated from http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
KeyOilTrends.pdf, p. 6.
2 Data from http://www.worldstopexports.com/crude-oil-imports-by-country/.

PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2018)4:71 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0125-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms

11

ARTICLE

PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0125-5
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International Studies at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences at The Jamestown
Foundation, Washington D.C., 19 September 2012.
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Aziey, Kazinform / /17 November 2011, accessed from http://new.inform.kz/rus/
article/2419779.
5 Stephen Blank, “China’s Recent Central Asian Energy Moves,” CACI Analyst issue of
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business/2012-06/05/content_25571119.htm.
8 International Energy Agency, Working Paper Series, “Natural Gas in China Market
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9 An EIA analysis, accessed from http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?ﬁps=UZ.
10 Uzbekistan i Kitai: vzaimovigodnoe sotrudnichestvo, russian.china. org.cn, 6 June
2012, accessed from http://russian.china.org.cn/exclusive/ txt/2012-06/06/
content_25591078.htm.
11 Michael Lelyveld, “China Shelves Central Asia Gas Plan,” Eurasia Review, 22 March
2017; accessed from http://www.eurasiareview.com/22032017-china-shelves-centralasia-gas-plan-analysis/?
utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A
+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29, on 22 March 2017.
12 China and Europe use the 1435 mm (4 ft 8 1⁄2 in) gauge, known as Standard gauge,
while Russia and the former Soviet republics including Kazakhstan use a 1520 mm
(4 ft 11 27⁄32 in) gauge.
13 “Chengdu will ran over 1000 Europe-bound cargo trains this year,” The People’s
Daily, 21 February 2017, p. 1.
14 “Yiwu-Russia cargo train inaugurated,” The People’s Daily, 15 August 2016, p. 1.
15 Wade Shepard, “Why The China-Europe ‘Silk Road’ Rail Network Is Growing Fast, “
Forbes, 28 January 2016; accessed from https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/
2016/01/28/why-china-europe-silk-road-rail-transport-is-growing-fast/3/
#1006f91a4d69.
16 Ibid.
17 Wade Shepard, “An Inside Look at China and Kazakhstan’s ‘Absurd’ Cross-Border
Free Trade Zone,” Forbes, 26 July 2016; accessed from https://www.forbes.com/sites/
wadeshepard/2016/07/26/an-inside-look-at-icbc-khorgos-china-and-kazakhstanscross-border-free-trade-zone/#6cc60c4c5c8f.
18 Wade Shepard, “Horgos: The First New City of the New Silk Road Emerges as a
Robot Manufacturing Hub,” Forbes, 9 January 2017; https://www.forbes.com/sites/
wadeshepard/2017/01/09/horgos-the-ﬁrst-new-city-of-the-new-silk-road-becomes-ahub-for-robots/#43bec2ff245e.
19 Tengrinews, “145-men ﬁght between Chinese and Kazakh miners in Kazakhstan, 65
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